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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS-CONUS REORGANIZATION 1973 (AS PERTAINS TO FORSCOM, TRADOC, HSC, OTEA AND CAA). VOLUME I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

M. H. Hamilton, et al

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21. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>The study provides an evaluation plan based on selected performance measures which will assist in the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the US Army over time in terms of the fulfillment of the goals and objectives of the CONUS Reorganization of 1973. The plan is intended to complement other evaluation means such as commanders' personal estimates and reviews by Department of Army specialized agencies.</p> <p>(cont'd)</p>														

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The plan is limited to selected commands and agencies that were created or significantly affected by the Reorganization (i.e., Force Command, Training and Doctrine Command, Health Services Command, Concepts Analysis Agency, and Operational Test and Evaluation Agency). The individual performance measures within the plan are specifically related to these commands and agencies as well as to the four major goals of the Reorganization. These goals are: (1) improve Army readiness of both Active and Reserve Components, (2) harness schools and combat development activities, (3) improve the quality and responsiveness of management, and (4) reinforce the role of the installation commander.

The basic analytical approach involved a disciplined identification of specific organizational subgoals/objectives, development of areas for measurement and means of their measurement, and finally, development of the integrated evaluation plan to include analytical techniques. The study used techniques and methods of effectiveness analyses. The plan provides for good use of existing data systems or new systems being established as the result of the reorganization to collect data for the evaluation. In some cases the formulation of performance measures directly into adequate quantifiable form is not possible and qualitative considerations in the form of surveys or special analyses must play an important role in assessment of the effectiveness of the reorganization.

The evaluation plan consists of five separate detailed assessment plans—one for each of the five commands and agencies to be evaluated. Each of the detailed plans is organized according to selected areas for measurement, with each area containing a varying number of performance measures. The areas for measurement are basically functional categories used to help managers at HQ DA and elsewhere in the Army to focus their attention on the broad management concerns associated with each of the organizations. The actual data collection effort on which any evaluation must be based is determined by the performance measures of which there are 88.

The individual performance measures can serve several purposes: (1) provide an indication of performance effectiveness in a specific area of concern, (2) be used in combination with other measures to develop an overall picture of effectiveness, and (3) serve as the basis for identifying opportunities, formulating policy alternatives, and taking action with regard to the management, organization, and operation of activities designed to achieve the mission/function covered by the measure.

An important use of the evaluation plan will be as a common means of communication for assessing the effectiveness of the CONUS Reorganization by those involved in the assessment process (i.e., the commands/agencies, AAA, IG, and Army Staff).

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**Measures of Effectiveness--
CONUS Reorganization 1973**

(As Pertains to FORSCOM, TRADOC, HSC, JTEA AND CAA)

Volume I--Executive Summary

by


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PREFACE

This report presents an evaluation plan designed to assist the Army in the overall assessment of its effectiveness in terms of the goals of the CONUS Reorganization - 1973. The report consists of four volumes. Volume I provides an executive summary. Volume II contains the detailed plan; it identifies measurement areas and performance measures and relates them to specific commands or agencies and goals. Data collection and analytical techniques are discussed in Volume III. Background information on the development of the plan to include information on study team visits and observations is provided in Volume IV.

The background material and information required for the study could not have been assembled in the time required had it not been for the unstinting cooperation of many individuals in the commands and agencies included in the evaluation plan. The critical reviews of Tasks I, II, and III were most helpful in narrowing the evaluation plan to manageable size and scope. Although these command and agency inputs contributed greatly to the plan's development, the final recommended plan is the sole responsibility of the authors.

A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Colonel Paul Raisig, the SAC Chairman, LTC Robert Michel, and LTC Winfield C. Frank, all of the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, for their time, guidance and assistance throughout the project. LTC Robert Faulkender, Headquarters FORSCOM; LTC Mark Hoke, Headquarters HSC; and Mrs. G. C. Milliken, Headquarters TRADOC, were particularly helpful in coordinating visits and study papers within their respective commands.

The manuscript was patiently prepared by Mrs. Betty H. Shifflett and Mrs. Elizabeth Ficklin of General Research Corporation.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE

This report summarizes an evaluation plan based on selected performance measures which was developed to assist in the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the US Army in terms of the fulfillment of the goals and objectives of the CONUS Reorganization of 1973. The plan is intended to complement other evaluation means such as commanders' personal estimates and reviews by Department of Army specialized agencies, for example, the Office of the Inspector General and the Army Audit Agency.

SCOPE

The plan is limited as specified by the study sponsor to selected commands and agencies that were created or significantly affected by the Reorganization, i.e., Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Health Services Command (HSC), Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), and Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA). The individual performance measures within the plan are specifically related to these commands and agencies as well as to the four major goals of the Reorganization. Those goals, also provided to the study team by the sponsor, are:

- Improve Army readiness of both Active and Reserve Components.
- Harness schools and combat development activities.
- Improve the quality and responsiveness of management.
- Reinforce the role of the installation commander.

The goals are refinements of several statements of guidance and purpose which had been the basis for the advance planning process used by the Army to develop the overall CONUS Reorganization plan. The goals summarized the basic thrusts of the Reorganization and served the significant

purpose of indicating the directions toward which future detailed planning and implementation should be headed.

IMPETUS FOR EVALUATION

The impetus for a formalized assessment of the CONUS Reorganization of 1973 was a product of:

- The intense interest of top Army management in an overall assessment of the performance of the five specified organizations.
- The extreme importance of the reorganizational changes that occurred.
- Recommendations from external sources for a follow-on evaluation.

Experience and a series of management studies during the period 1966-1972 had identified and defined important problems under the CONARC-CDC concept of organization. Moreover, declining manpower, increasing costs, and reduced purchasing power all pointed to the need for realignment and strengthening of various Army elements. Top Army management wanted to have a means of assessing overall organizational performance within CONUS in a routine manner which would assist in managing ongoing operations plus encourage the design and implementation of any needed changes in the future without excessive delay and turbulence.

The very real importance of the changes which occurred because of the 1973 Reorganization was another factor in the impetus for the development of this evaluation plan. In the past it had been decided that CONARC's span of control was too broad to manage both the readiness and training missions with proper effectiveness. But now the question was whether two co-equal commands, FORSCOM and TRADOC, each with command over assigned installations, could fulfill their missions cooperatively. In the past, the separation of combat developers from the service schools had resulted in the inability to utilize combat developments resources with the desired effectiveness. Now the question was whether the inclusion of the Combat Developments Command's elements within the new TRADOC structure would result, in fact, in the closer integration of combat developments products and activities with the actual needs of decision makers and trainers. Each of the new organizations--FORSCOM, TRADOC, HSC, CAA, OTEA--brought with it new questions. All of these questions focused on a single concern: Would the new structures help the Army do its job? Answers to this concern were essential if further improvements were to be planned and implemented.

effectively. The importance of each organization's mission underscored the necessity that trends in organizational performance be identified and analysed before they developed into organizational crises requiring dramatic corrective action.

Providing still further impetus for the development of this evaluation plan was the interest of Congress and its investigative agency, the General Accounting Office. In part this interest stemmed from Congressional concern for the increasing costs of manpower and weapon systems, and the desire to improve the ratio of combat to support resources. In part this interest reflected one of the conclusions of the GAO's report on the Reorganization:

We believe that the Army recognized the need for organizational change and accomplished that complex and difficult task of planning satisfactorily. The Army should establish a formal evaluation mechanism to measure the effectiveness of its new organization... The... findings should be available to the Army's key decisionmakers for periodic review. This should help insure that the reorganization goals and objectives are met.¹

BASELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT

Three plausible baselines were considered for the evaluation: past performance, theoretical standards of desired future performance, and trends in real present performance compared over time. The proposed evaluation plan centers on the third baseline. Its aim is to define reasonable, acceptable criteria and to identify sources of data which will be sufficiently stable to permit a series of iterative evaluations for the purposes of identifying trends in performance.

¹Comptroller General of the United States, The Army Reorganization for the 1970s: an Assessment of the Planning, DOD B-172707, August 13, 1973, pp 19-20.

A comparison of present organizational performance with the past would have focused on the comparison of the COMARC/CDC concept with the present FORSCOM/TRADOC/HSC/CAA/OTEA concept. Comparable criteria and sources of data would have been necessary. The data base for such a comparison is incomplete, and totally absent in several instances since past organizations had no reason to anticipate the requirements of the evaluation plan now being developed. Because of this and the unlikelihood that the Army would consider reverting to its former configuration, comparisons with the past could only be incomplete and of partial value. Nonetheless, this approach is recognized in the present plan where individual measures are categorized according to the availability of data for past comparisons. This is done because of the Army's desire to make at least broad judgments as to the advantages and disadvantages of the Reorganization in comparison with the past.

A comparison of present performance with desired future performance would have required that Army managers establish theoretical performance standards including the specification of the conditions under which those standards could be attained. The Army did, of course, articulate the four major goals of the Reorganization. These goals, broadly conceived as they were, served to point the Reorganization planners and the organizations they designed toward generalized directions. But those goals did not provide criteria of success or failure. Nor were such criteria provided elsewhere in the planning effort. Army management desired to build into its organizations the capability of adapting flexibility to changing environmental conditions. The setting of narrow performance criteria would have restricted unnecessarily the ability of managers at the command and agency levels to revise their internal structures. Improvement in future performance is recognized in the assessment plan as a matter requiring the selection by Army managers of timely strategies and techniques aimed at meeting performance objectives suited to specific situations rather than presuming to anticipate those situations. Information developed by this plan should help make those decisions more accurate and effective.

The proposed evaluation plan emphasizes the third baseline: trends in real present performance compared over time. Such a baseline uses the initial data collection to establish a point of comparison for future data collections. It rests the responsibility of Army managers to examine the actual measurements and trends to determine if performance is acceptable under conditions existing at the time. It also remains the responsibility of Army managers to take such corrective actions as may be required and to implement evaluation activities to determine if those corrective actions were appropriate in fact.

ASSESSMENT APPROACH

Parameters

The evaluation plan has been formulated within guidance provided by the sponsor. This guidance emphasized the needs, (first, to utilize existing data and reporting mechanisms to the maximum possible extent, and second, to emphasize simplicity in the plan, keeping the number of measures to a minimum. This guidance appeared to represent the objective to produce an evaluation plan which:

- could provide adequate coverage of key areas by sampling of selective indicators.
- could be reported in concise terms.
- could provide comparable data suitable to trend analysis.
- could be administered with minimal additional resource requirements at HQ DA or at the affected commands and agencies.
- would be accepted as a reasonable reporting requirement by the various commands and agencies from whom information would be collected.
- could be used by the Army itself with little or no dependence on outside contractors.

This guidance affected the design of the study in two principal ways. First, every effort was made to avoid new reporting requirements. Thus, in some instances, a satisfactory existing report was included in preference to designing a new data requirement which might have provided a more exact description of a particular issue. Second, the need to achieve a relative simplicity of design meant that the assessment plan would have to avoid the pyramiding of measure upon measure, a method which assumes

that overall organizational performance can be understood as a series of direct causal relationships. Given the numerous external influences upon organizational performance throughout the Army, such pyramiding would have been very vulnerable to inaccuracies.

Approaches to Assessment

Within the parameters established by the sponsor's guidance, the applicability of both of the traditional approaches to the analysis of organizational effectiveness—the goal approach and the functional approach—were examined. In the end, a hybrid approach was adopted because, while the four major goals were prescribed by the Army, the dynamic nature of the Army's operation also requires the use of the organization itself as a frame of reference. The importance of the functional approach was emphasized by the fact that the Army underwent two additional reorganizations of major magnitude (reductions and realignments of the Army Staff and reductions of overseas headquarters) during the preparation of this evaluation plan. Both of these reorganizations in some measure impacted on the commands and agencies to be evaluated. Furthermore, the four goals were stated not as final conditions to be achieved but rather as intentions to improve the performance of four crucial functions which cut across organizational boundaries in many instances.

Models for Analysis

Several models for analysis were considered in the design of the evaluation plan. For the purposes of this study a modified systems model based on the phases of organizational behavior (Figure 1) was used. This model emphasizes the flow of resources and activities found in each of the five commands and agencies without attempting to place the five organizations within a single common system.




Fig. 1 -Phases of Organizational Behavior

The flow of resources and activities in each organization was defined as having three basic phases: input, throughput, and output. Wherever possible, measures of output were used, since the question of organizational effectiveness is essentially a question of an organization's ability to produce desired end products. Where output measures were not readily available, measures of input and throughput were used if it could be reasonably assumed that changes in those input and throughput factors would directly affect the production of outputs. For example, TDA figures represent an input factor (manpower) which is presumed to influence the workload performed during a given year by a given organization.

Several other models of organizational analysis were considered but rejected (Figure 2). Models based on organizational theory were rejected in large part because so many of them are based on assumptions concerning employee satisfaction or "psychological contracts" assumed to exist among an organization's members. Organizational theory models also tend to emphasize factors affecting organizational survival, considering survival as the ultimate "output." The Army's concerns relative to the 1973 Reorganization, however, were less theoretical and more practical, more concerned with the specific functions—such as readiness, training, materiel testing, health care, analytical studies—that the five organizations were expected to fulfill.

<u>ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY</u>	<u>SYSTEMS DESIGN</u>	<u>ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION</u>
STRUCTURE	SIMPLICITY	PLANNING
HIERARCHY	FLEXIBILITY	ORGANIZATION
AUTHORITY	RELIABILITY	COMMAND
SPECIALIZATION	ECONOMY	COORDINATION
SPAN OF CONTROL	ACCEPTABILITY	CONTROL
LINE AND STAFF		

Fig. 2—Rejected Model Approaches

System design models were rejected because they tend to be too comprehensive in scope for the purposes of this study. Such models emphasize the relationships of organizations to their external environments as well as the complex relationships among the internal parts of each organization. Use of a system model would have directed management's attention to such issues as communication and policy making between and within organizations. These issues, however important in themselves, were not appropriate to the requirements of the study sponsor. Moreover, the cost of implementing an adequate system evaluation plan would have been prohibitive.

Finally, organizational analysis models based on the so-called elements of administration were also considered and rejected for the purposes of this study. These models start with some definition of the functions of management--such as: plan, organize, control, coordinate, evaluate--and relate these functions to an organization's performance. But the emphasis of these models is on the activities of managers themselves rather than on the overall performance of the organization.

METHODOLOGY FOR PLAN DEVELOPMENT

The methodology for the development of the evaluation plan embraced several key tasks:

- Review and analysis of Army documentation of the Reorganization of 1973 and earlier reorganization studies.
- Identification of innovative changes, resulting interrelationships, and the subgoals and objectives of the five organizations involved in the evaluation. The interrelationships among these organizations, nine major functional areas, and the Reorganization goals also were defined. (Appendix II details this.)
- Selection of specific areas for measurement and performance measures.
- Identification of supporting data elements, their sources and frequency of collection, and analytical techniques to be used.

Completion of these tasks was facilitated by visits to a representative sample of the activities affected by the Reorganization and discussions with several commanders and staff members at the various

levels within CONUS. (Appendix 1 provides a recap of visits and observations.) Their inputs regarding measurability, importance, and comprehensiveness of measures helped considerably in further refining and limiting the areas for measurement and their related performance measures.

OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION PLAN

Table 1 is a summary of the proposed evaluation plan. The performance measures are grouped into six summary evaluation areas that easily relate them to Army missions and operations. Each performance measure also applies to one or more commands and to one or more of the four major goals of the Reorganization that are identified in the plan by letters as follows:

A - Improve Army readiness of both Active and Reserve Components Forces.

B - Harness schools and combat developments activities.

C - Improve the quality and responsiveness of management.

D - Reinforce the role of the installation commander.

Performance Measures

The individual performance measures can serve several purposes:

- Provide an indication of performance effectiveness in a specific area of concern.

- Be used in combination with other measures to develop an overall picture of effectiveness.

- Serve as the basis for identifying opportunities, formulating policy alternatives, and taking action with regard to the management, organization, and operation of activities designed to achieve the mission/function covered by the measure.

There are 63 performance measures included in the summary plan. These are considered the minimum essential to provide adequate coverage of key areas that contribute to a meaningful evaluation. An additional 25 performance measures are contained in Appendices A, B, C, D, and E which are the detailed assessment plans for each command or agency. These additional measures would provide important complementary support for the assessment but also would require a larger investment of resources for the evaluation.

Table 1
EVALUATION PLAN SUMMARY

Summary evaluation areas and measures	Applicable command/agency	Reporting frequency	Estimated level of effort required	Related goals	Valid for pre-organization comparison
TRAINING (MANAGEMENT, INVENTORY AND SUPPORT)					
The ratio of current assigned strength for HQ TRAINX (less DCSB and DCSBUT) compared to July 1973 authorized IHA strength.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	No
Costs (adjusted for inflation) per actual student/trainee.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
Critical IHA shortages compared to training loads (DA-programmed and actual) by HQ.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The percentage of average Active School/ATC in-training loads (DA and TRAINX-programmed) obtained.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The percent of student population not enrolled in course.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The average cost per trainee of Acquisition (Overhead Travel-Balanced (OTB))	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The quality of service school instruction as demonstrated by on-the-job performance of recent graduates.	TRAINX & RS	Annually	Substantial	B,C	No
The average number of months required for the introduction of new doctrine.	TRAINX	Annually	Moderate	B,C	No
The percent of service school faculty one-year devoted to support of collective (unit) training.	TRAINX	Annually	Substantial	B,C	No
The percent of achievement in filling the Army's annual requirements (Active and Reserve) for second lieutenants.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The ratio of the authorized current assigned strength for TRAINX (DCSBUT) and the four DPT Region Headquarters compared to the July 1973 authorized IHA strength for these activities.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	No
Percent of total cadets commissioned through the Reserve DPT Program that are female or minority cadets.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
The percent of reserve cadets commissioned through the Reserve DPT cadets awarded membership assistance.	TRAINX	Annually	Minimum	C	Yes
MANIN/SS (MANAGEMENT AND STATUS)					
The percentage achievement of overall unit status in relation to authorized levels of organization (ALO) and the Department of Army Master Priority List (DAPML).	FORSCOM	Semi-annually	Minimum	A,C	Yes
The ratio of combat to support personnel strengths.	FORSCOM	Annually	Minimum	A,C	Yes
The percentage achievement of unit training objectives by units submitting readiness reports.	FORSCOM	Monthly	Minimum	A,C,F	Yes
The percentage of STRAF unit personnel assigned on special duty to installation functions.	FORSCOM	Quarterly	Minimum	A,C,D	No
Percentage of materiel operationally ready (OR), not operationally ready maintenance (NORM), and not operationally ready supply (NORS).	FORSCOM	Monthly	Minimum	A,C,D	Yes
Percentage of Active Army Bns and separate cos tested and failed (AT/ORTA)	FORSCOM	Annually	Minimum	A	Yes
The percentage of Reserve Component units achieving training objectives (company or comparable level proficiency).	FORSCOM	Annually	Minimum	A	Yes
The percentage of materiel required for training that is operationally ready (OR), not operationally ready maintenance (NORM), and not operationally ready supply (NORS).	FORSCOM	Semi-annually	Minimum	A	Yes
The percentage of "G" personnel time spent in the field for assistance purposes.	FORSCOM	Quarterly	Minimum	C	No
The timeliness of request satisfaction by HQ for valid assistance requests from Reserve Component units.	FORSCOM	Quarterly	Minimum	C	No
The standardization of the approaches utilized by ARMs and BAs in carrying out their missions and functions.	FORSCOM	Quarterly	Moderate	C	No
The management of Reserve Component personnel regarding the impacts of the loss of dedicated unit advisors for most battalions and smaller units, the greater availability of technical expertise in functional areas, and the emphasis on "hands on" assistance.	FORSCOM	One-time	Moderate	C	No

Table 1 (continued)

Summary evaluation areas and measures	Applicable command/agency	Reporting frequency	Estimated level of effort required	Related goals	Valid for performance comparison
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS (MANAGEMENT AND TRENDS)					
The ratio of the combined assigned strength of the TRADOC MGSAD and the CAGMs, PACMA, and JAGC to the July 1971 authorized TDA strengths for these activities	TRADOC	Annually	Minimum	B,C	No
The production of Required Operational Capability (ROC) documents.	TRADOC	Annually	Minimum	B,C	No
The percent of total annual combat development tasks (programmed and unprogrammed) accomplished.	TRADOC	Annually	Substantial	B,C	No
The index of the usefulness and utility of medical inputs into the combat development process managed by TRADOC and medical development activities that are managed by DTMC.	DTMC	Annually	Minimum	B	No
The extent of "slippage" of more than two weeks from established ADAMS/PRISM/PTI schedules for combat and force development tasks being performed and/or coordinated by TRADOC.	TRADOC	Annually	Substantial	B,C	No
HEALTH CARE (MANAGEMENT AND DELIVERY)					
Average number of personal staff visits per MEDDAC per quarter by the Regional Coordinator or his staff in the interest of medical professionalization and standardization of health care delivery.	RSI	Quarterly	Minimum	C	No
Percent of supported installation commanders contacted by the Regional Coordinator for the purpose of determining their views on the effectiveness of health care.	RSI	Semi-annually	Minimum	C,D	No
Ratio of RSI to a total strength to total RSI actual strength.	RSI	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The ratio of actual to authorized of the percentage of medical professionals (doctors and nurses) who are not involved in the direct delivery of health care.	RSI	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The percent of RSI's annual funding program that is distributed to subordinate elements during the last two months of the fiscal year.	RSI	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The index of installation commander satisfaction with locally provided health services.	RSI	Annually	Substantial	A,C,D	No
The index of patient satisfaction with health care and its delivery.	RSI	Annually	Substantial	C	No
SPICED DA MATHEMATICS AND DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT					
The distribution of the fiscal year CAA work effort.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The extent of actual utilization of CAA task products in support of high level Army decision making.	CAA	Annually	Substantial	C	No
The ratio of current assigned strength for CAA compared to July 1971 authorized TDA strength.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The allocation and expenditure of CAA resources for model improvement and development.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The percent of total DDM work effort utilized in direct support of the HQ DA staff office to which CAA is assigned.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
"Slippage" from established schedules for tasks being performed by CAA.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The ratio of study contract funds to total CAA costs.	CAA	Annually	Minimum	C	No
Variance between CAA and other Army force/combat developers.	CAA	Annually	Moderate	B,C	No
The ratio of DTMC estimation of user testing cost requirements to actual test costs.	DTMC	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The percentage of test findings qualified by insufficient personnel, training, time, space, or instrumentation.	DTMC	Annually	Minimum	C	No
The effect of DTMC independent evaluations on decision making in the materiel acquisition process and the development of concepts, doctrine, and organizations.	DTMC	Annually	Moderate	C	No
The number of DTMC statements based on other than findings of fact appear in test reports and evaluations.	DTMC	Annually	Moderate	C	No
The utility of the STIP as a tool for managing resources for major and selected nonmajor systems (OT, major PDE), and joint user testing by DTMC.	DTMC	Biennially	Moderate	B,C	No
The adequacy of DTMC management (regulations, policies, procedures) and organization (structure, personnel, occupational specialties) for intercommand user-developer tester coordination.	DTMC	Biennially	Moderate	B,C	No

Table 1 (continued)

Summary evaluation areas and measures	Applicable research/agency	Reporting frequency	Estimated level of effort required	Related goals	Valid for programmatic comparison
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT					
Supply Division Fill Rate.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Quarterly	Minimum	C, D	No
Manufacture Production/Outgoing.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Monthly	Minimum	C, D	No
Installation generated recruitment and recruitment ratios.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Monthly	Minimum	C, D	Yes
The percent of WACER's annual funding program that is distributed to subordinate elements the last two months of the fiscal year.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Annually	Minimum	C, D	Yes
The percent of the installation's annual funding program that is obligated in the last thirty (30) days of the fiscal year.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Annually	Minimum	C, D	Yes
The extent of modification (average number of changes) of installation response contracts.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Annually	Minimum	C, D	No
The release of unobligated funds by installations during the last two months of the fiscal year.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Annually	Minimum	C, D	Yes
Percent of stock fund obligations to sales and stock fund obligations to demands.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Quarterly	Minimum	C, D	Yes
Percent of pay changes rejected (JMRPS-Army status report).	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Quarterly	Minimum	C, D	Yes
Percent of financed requirements to total requirements for maintenance of real property.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Annually	Minimum	C, D	Yes
Percent of other construction (direct expenses) to maintenance of real property (MRP) (direct expenses).	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Quarterly	Minimum	C, D	Yes
Percent of occupancy of family housing.	TRACAC & PAMETAC	Semi-annually	Minimum	C, D	Yes

Appendices A through E include the following detailed information on each performance measure: a full description of the measure, supporting data elements, data sources, current reporting status, the recommended collection frequency to support the evaluation, and suggested analytical procedures. Appendix F contains a discussion of data collection including sample surveys and their techniques and limitations. Appendix G provides discussions and examples of analytical techniques to be used in support of the plan.

While most of the recommended measures are quantitative in nature, the plan does not attempt to aggregate the various kinds of information into a single score of effectiveness. This is not practical due to the magnitude and breadth of the activities covered. Moreover, it is not compatible with the use of the evaluation plan as a means for monitoring ongoing operations..

Reporting Frequency

About 66 percent of the essential measures are based on the reporting of data on an annual basis. Two related to Reserve Components support are one-time measures unless the initial results indicate the need for follow-on evaluations. Except for these two, data collection should cover at least two years. It is possible that the Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, will choose to use several of the indicators as a permanent means of tracking operations in order to identify opportunities for improvements.

Fiscal year 1975 data should be used for the first iteration of the evaluation plan with no data collection before January 1975. This schedule is generally compatible with the times for measure established in an independent study, sponsored by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.² The schedule also allows ample time for final selection of measures, designation of personnel to conduct the evaluation, and finalization of integrated procedures based on using this plan and other means for the full assessment of effectiveness.

² LTC Newell Vinson, USA, A Delphi Study: Assessing Army Reorganization - CONUS - 73, ICAF, 10 June 1974.

Levels of Effort

For purposes of this evaluation plan, levels of effort are defined as follows:

- Minimum - less than 2 technical man-months (TMM).
- Moderate - 2 to 6 TMM.
- Substantial - over 6 TMM.

Approximately 76 percent of the recommended essential performance measures are estimated to require minimum levels of effort. This is possible because of the ready availability of the supporting data elements. Only 7 measures are estimated to require substantial efforts. In each case the importance of the measure is viewed to justify the resource expenditure required.

Pre-Reorganization Comparisons

The evaluation plan summary includes an indication of the validity of each of the performance measures for making comparisons with pre-reorganization performance. As indicated earlier, past performance under the former organizational framework is not the proper baseline for an evaluation that is primarily concerned with effectiveness now and in the future. On the other hand, if comparisons with the past are desired, the possibility exists for several areas as indicated in Table 2.

USES OF THE EVALUATION PLAN

This assessment plan was specifically designed to have several uses. These include:

- To provide a substantive indication of the effectiveness of the Army in its reorganized form.
- To provide HQ DA and various Army levels with key indicators of the on-going effectiveness of the Army in performing its missions and functions.
- To serve as a foundation for taking corrective actions in response to deficiencies in Army performance or changes in the Army's operational environment.

Detailed command/agency reviews on a task-by-task basis during the phased development of the evaluation plan helped to insure the plan's utility. During these reviews particular emphasis was placed on the:

- Comprehensiveness of coverage, including organizational changes, resulting interactions, and areas for measurement versus command/agency missions.

- Validity, measurability, reliability, and comprehensiveness of the associated performance measures.

The utility of the evaluation plan to measure the accomplishment of the Reorganization goals is demonstrated in Appendix I. Using informally collected data to test selected performance measures, a preliminary assessment is developed. These data are supplemented by information gained by the study team through interviews, briefings, and discussions during its contacts with over 300 representatives of the commands and agencies involved.

LIMITS OF THE PLAN

Although highly versatile in its use, there are also limitations to this plan. Principal among these are:

- The several external variables that can affect the performance of each command and agency. The organizations whose performance is to be evaluated can not, for example, control changes in Congressional or DOD policies and resource decisions. Detailed lists of such variables as they affect each of the commands and agencies are found in Annexes A.2, B.2, C.2, D.2, and E.2.

- The narrow scope of the plan, focusing on only five of the commands and agencies affected by the Reorganization of 1973. This has meant that the plan could not address fully the crucial issues of the interactions and interrelationships between the affected organizations and other commands, agencies, and offices. For example, both readiness and training are subject to many factors determined at HQ DA and ANC. Issues such as personnel policy formulation and operation of the wholesale supply systems were not included. Inevitably, the scope of the plan neglects some key aspects of Army operations.

• The conciseness of the plan, providing key performance measures rather than a description of the total system. Conciseness is a major virtue of the evaluation plan in that it permits Army managers to pinpoint trends in areas of major concern without a large expenditure of time and resources. But conciseness has its limitations. Principally, this means that the information provided by the plan will not always contain final answers. The information frequently must be interpreted within the context of current demands and situations affecting the ability of the various commands and agencies to manage as desired. While the performance measures reflect the most important and significant aspects of organizational performance (within the limits noted here), they do not always provide definitive indications of the effectiveness of performance. Rather they point to areas where further investigation may be required, where modifications in operating procedures may be considered, and where future, more detailed, evaluation efforts may be directed.

POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAN

Any decision to actively assess performance involves a resource allocation decision along with a decision regarding the necessity of the assessment information involved. Therefore, the decision of whether or not to extend this plan to include additional Army entities and/or measures must be made by weighing the potential value of information to be obtained from assessment activities against the resources required to implement those activities. The proposed/present performance measures are all viewed as having high utility. Close attention was paid to the resource requirements of the measures, resulting in an evaluation plan utilizing existing reporting systems wherever possible. If the intended benefits of improved management capability are realized and extension of this evaluation plan is desired, Army managers will want to consider two other areas:

- The measurement and assessment of the performance of Army entities not presently included in the assessment plan.

- The development of additional performance measures to supplement the proposed performance measures, particularly in the areas of individual training, combat and force developments, and unit training.

SUMMARY

During visits to the commands and agencies involved in this evaluation plan, it was obvious that they were deeply concerned and hard at work in developing means to measure their own effectiveness. This proposed evaluation plan will be a valuable aid to them in addition to providing the Army Staff with its own set of measures for a valid, economic assessment of the effectiveness of the major portion of the CONUS Reorganization 1973.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALO	authorized level of organization
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AML	Army medical laboratory
AMS	Army management structure
ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
ARR	Army readiness region
ARTEP	Army training and evaluation program
ASARC	Army Systems Acquisition Review Council
AT	annual training
ATT	Army training test
CAA	Concepts Analysis Agency
CAA-FUR	Concepts Analysis Agency-Personnel Utilization Report
CACDA	Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity
CDC	Combat Developments Command
CDEC	Combat Developments Experimentation Command
CDMIS	Combat Developments Management Information System
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
CONUSA	Continental United States Army
COPO	Chief, Office of Personnel Operations
DANPL	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DCSCD	Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments
DCSCOMPT	Deputy Chief of Staff Comptroller
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DCSRM	Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management

DCSROTC	Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC
DCSTS	Deputy Chief of Staff Training and Schools
DMEDA	Director of Medical Activities
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
FDTE	force development testing and evaluation
FLD OF AGCY	field operating agency
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTTP	Five Year Test Program
GOCOM	general officer command
HSC	Health Services Command
IDT	inactive duty training
IPR	in process review
LOGC	Logistics Center
MACOM	major Army command
MASSTER	Modern Army Selected Systems Test, Evaluation and Review
MCCU	medical care composite unit
MEDCEN	medical center
MEDDAC	medical department activity
MILPERCEN	Military Personnel Center
MPA	Military Personnel, Army
NET	new equipment training
NORM	not operationally ready maintenance
NORS	not operationally ready supply
OJT	on-the-job training
OMA	Operation and Maintenance Army
OMAR	Operation and Maintenance Army Reserve
OMARNG	Operation and Maintenance Army National Guard
ORTT	operational readiness training test
OR	operationally ready
OST	One-station training
OT	operational testing
OTEA	Operational Test and Evaluation Agency
PACDA	Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity
REDCOM	readiness condition
RC	Reserve Components

RDA	regional dental activity
RDTE	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
REP-63	Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963
RG	readiness group
ROC	required operational capability
SCORES	Scenario Oriented Recurring Evaluation System
STAG	United States Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group
STEADFAST	Study effort leading to the reorganization of COMARC, COMUSA, CDC, and USAREC and the establishment of FORSCOM and TRADOC
STP SPT	staff support
TAMA	Training Aids Management Agency
TASO	Training Aids Service Office
TECOM	Test and Evaluation Command
TMM	technical man month
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USACC	United States Army Communications Command
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command